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The author calls attention to a neglected force in urban political life by highlight-
ing how positivism undermined scholarly interest in cultural forces, particularly
religion. She shows that although community organizing was formerly led by leftist
radicals, today it is led by the church. Five factors contribute to the leading role of
congregations in grassroots organizing and urban revitalization. Analysis and
interpretation of these factors led the author to conclude that secularization and
urban restructuring have left only the church with a sufficient moral and institu-
tional presence in distressed urban neighborhoods to spearhead a return to more
direct participatory forms of democracy.
As the twenty-first century dawns, devolution is well under way, and there is evi-dence of renewed interest in urban revitalization. Suddenly there is a vast infusion
of resources into community policing to reduce crime and the fear of crime. Large sums
have been allocated for the Clinton administration’s Empowerment Zone/Enterprise
Community program. Chain stores, having saturated suburban markets, have rediscov-
ered the city and are moving back in. At the same time, there is a revitalization of com-
munity activism among those who are determined that working-class and poor people
not be left out of the policymaking process and that there should be no return to the
gentrification that occurred in the past.1 But the nature of community activism has
changed during the past fifty years.2 No longer is grassroots organizing led by Left radi-
cals working with political clubs and labor unions, as in the 1930s and 1940s. Religious
groups take the lead in community organizing today. The object of this article is to
examine the nature and role of this faith-based activism.
From antiquity onward, governing the polis was viewed as a moral project that aimed
to conform the political order to the unchangeable law of the heavens. The study of
politics concerned practical and philosophical questions about how citizens might culti-
vate moral excellence in their life in community and thus realize the highest attainable
good.3 This “formative project” is central to the classical republican tradition.4 But the
appearance of Nicolai Machiavelli during the Italian Renaissance prefigured the col-
lapse of the project. The explicitly moral and metaphysical aspects of politics were
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Enlightenment onward, these forces of modernity established deepening dichotomies
between sacred and secular, public and private, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, until
discourses that explicitly address questions of morality and faith were relegated to the
private domain.5
Liberal democratic theory, like the classical republican tradition it has largely re-
placed, was originally based in natural law doctrine and is itself a deeply normative
system. It locates moral authority not in the state but in the individual conscience. Lib-
erty is protected less for its own sake than to ensure that the state remains forever subor-
dinate to the relationship between the individual and the Creator, whose will can be
known to humans through reason.6 But the modernist mind in its purest cast, which has
come to disavow natural law as a normative system of political order, holds that values
derive from subjective passions and are inaccessible through reason. Reason, it is
claimed, is instrumental; therefore, neither science nor politics can establish end values.
By the mid-twentieth century, the separation of reason from the transcendent dimen-
sion of natural law doctrine seemed complete.7 Rationality had come to signify nothing
more than efficiency. “The term rational is never applied to an agent’s ends, but only to
his means. This follows from the definition of rational as efficient, that is, maximizing
output for a given input,” according to economist Anthony Downs.8 Scientific positivism
had placed values outside the pale of the political and even the scholarly enterprise.
But the loss of a moral vocabulary in politics, education, scholarship, and public
discourse generally has adverse implications for democracy, as well as the individual and
society, the magnitude of which scholars are just now beginning to grasp.9 With
positivism’s dominance apparently ebbing, there is a growing appreciation for the impor-
tance of culture. In 1987, Aaron Wildavsky expounded the need for a cultural approach
in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association. In Community,
Culture, and Economic Development, I offered theoretical and empirical arguments for
the value of a cultural approach that would yield a more fine-tuned understanding of the
causes and consequences of development policies than theories that are based on self-
interest alone.10
By replacing normative theory with a narrow focus on interests — generally con-
strued to mean economic interests — and conflicts surrounding their distribution —
“who gets what, when, and where” — political science has fostered the widespread ac-
ceptance of two harmful fallacies with policy ramifications for cities. The first reduces
human choice to a rational calculus of profit maximization and overlooks the social
embeddedness of preference formation.11 The second, which derives from the first,
equates economic growth with the general good and glosses over its inevitable social
costs and inequities.12
Urban scholarship has been criticized for contributing to this naive economism.13 It
economistic assumptions have bolstered the ideological underpinnings for disastrous
development initiatives in cities, because market calculations of the impacts of develop-
ment projects that fail to take account of nonmarket values are susceptible to the error of
overestimating their benefits and underestimating their real costs.14 The real costs in-
clude population displacement, commodification and destruction of indigenous cul-
tures, environmental degradation, economic and environmental injustice, destruction of
social capital, and the moral and spiritual impoverishment of society.15
Robert Waste takes urban theorists to task for neglecting the larger normative and
prescriptive questions concerning the democratic prospects for urban governance in the
United States and abroad.16 Elaine Sharp contrasts urban theory with the work of cultural
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theorists,17 arguing that urbanists’ single-minded focus on interests, to the exclusion of
moral and cultural values, leaves them ill-equipped to deal with the morals-based social
conflicts into which local governments are increasingly drawn.18 But a growing body of
scholarship shows that urbanists are enlarging the scope of their inquiry beyond political
and economic elites that drive policy from “above” and focusing on less instrumental
voices and values that are gathering force from “below.”19
D. C. Leege, J. A. Lieske, and K. D. Wald urge political scientists to give closer atten-
tion to cultural differences associated with religious, ethnic, racial, and social class out-
looks in explaining political behavior.20 The fruitfulness of this kind of inquiry has been
demonstrated by a handful of scholars who have investigated the political impact of
religion in local communities.21 This article explores the role of religious institutions in
urban revitalization. It considers the possibility that the moral and political vision and
the long-term commitment necessary to address the urban crisis will come from faith
communities working from the bottom up to redeem individual lives, distressed neigh-
borhoods, and whole cities, as claimed by some scholars, community organizers, reli-
gious activists, and other observers.22
How is one to interpret the fact that in the mid-1970s, after the Nixon administration
had reduced funding for the War on Poverty, the Campaign for Human Development, a
Roman Catholic agency that funded thousands of ecumenically sponsored, community-
based organizations was named by the Ford Foundation as the largest and most impor-
tant source of financial support for community organizing in the United States?23 Is it not
significant that religious congregations provide the bases for the most vital and enduring
of all institutions engaged in civic activities, community organizing, and community
development in U.S. cities today?24
Pursuant to these questions, I first discuss historical shifts in the place of religion in
public life generally and then present an overview of the community organizing and
development activities in which urban missions and ministries are engaged. Next, I iden-
tify the intrinsic and contextual factors that, to a large extent, account for the leading
role of that set of diverse faith communities referred to collectively as the church. Inter-
pretation of these factors leads to the conclusion that the church has a unique capability
to act as a catalyst for transforming distressed urban communities and renewing the cul-
tural, moral, economic, and political life of the cities.
Homo Religioso in Exile
In the medieval world, economics and religion were inextricably linked. But capitalism
began to emerge during the Renaissance, and by the end of the seventeenth century,
homo oeconomicus had driven homo religioso out of the marketplace.25 Warren Nord
describes this transition.
The free market had become the key to economics: usury, which had once been a sin,
was rehabilitated as interest and took its inevitable place in the process of capital forma-
tion; the concept of a just price gave way to supply and demand; guilds collapsed before
the need for free labor; charity and begging, once cardinal virtues and signs of saintli-
ness, became vices; self-interest and acquisitiveness, once vices, became the governing
virtues of the economic world; economic guidance was no longer sought in theology but
in the value-free calculus of economists and hardheaded businessmen . . . The world of
economics had been secularized.26
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By the nineteenth century, a strict division of human activity into two discrete
spheres, public and private, had become the reigning principle in American political
practice. Religion would be consigned to the private sphere for all but ceremonial pur-
poses, religiously based popular movements notwithstanding.27 Once the sharp di-
chotomy between sacred and secular had enabled the market and the state to secure their
domain over the secular, a category that includes politics, economics, science, and tech-
nology, the republican democratic tradition, which explicitly seeks to realize the good,
was replaced by the liberal tradition. In Michael Sandel’s analysis, the transition from
“formative republic” to “procedural republic”was complete by the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.28 In other words, the liberal democratic state is now limited to maintaining a neutral
framework in which unencumbered individuals can enter into contracts for the maximal
attainment of their individual interests.
Until fairly recently, the functional dichotomy between public and private, sacred and
secular, was bridged by various “mediating structures,” namely, “Those institutions
standing between the individual in his [sic] private life and the large institutions of
public life.”29 Among those institutions which serve to attenuate the individual’s experi-
ence of social isolation and political powerlessness are family, neighborhood, church,
civic organization, club, settlement house, political party, electoral system, and labor
union. Many of those institutions, however, are either decaying or have already died out.
Even the (theologically) liberal church, having largely abdicated its prophetic role as a
witness against abuses of state power and generator of new visions, largely limits its
influence and activities to the private sphere by “helping individuals to be more kind
and honest within existing structures,” according to theologian Harvey Cox.30
 With the liberal philosophy of the procedural republic ascendant and the mediating
institutions that traditionally served to bridge its two spheres declining, it would appear
that the quarantine of religious and moral values is all but complete. But there is a para-
dox to be reckoned with here: for many theorists, the freer an individual is from any prior
moral claims or attachments, the deeper is his or her sense of the anomic precariousness
of individual existence in isolation from the larger society.31 The decline of those struc-
tures which traditionally functioned to translate private values into public purposes,
together with the resulting impoverishment of civic discourse, have contributed to a
resurgence of religious activism in recent years.
A Religious Resurgence
Contrary to predictions that the secularization of advanced modernity signified the
irretrievable decline of religion as a significant force in the world, there was evidence, by
the early 1980s, of a worldwide reappearance of religion as a potent political force. “New
forms of religion and spirituality directly address issues of the moral meaning of exist-
ence, which modern institutions so thoroughly tend to dissolve.”32 Belying the assump-
tions about human nature that undergird economics and public choice approaches to
political science, human beings evidently still strive to find purpose and meaning in life
precisely because the acquisitive roles of profit-maximizer and consumer leave them
feeling diminished, powerless, and unfulfilled.33 Given religion’s promise of personal
and collective empowerment, the recent upsurge in popular religion, especially among
women and minorities, should not be surprising.34
It seems that the procedural republic, by apotheosizing the market and “liberating”
the worker from social attachments and moral encumbrances, so that he or she might
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respond more freely to market forces, serves well the interests and values of a small class
of industrial and postindustrial capitalists; however, it systematically excludes the val-
ues and visions of the vast majority, especially women, minorities, the poor, and those
whose national origins are in what is called “the periphery.” The expansion of their indi-
vidual rights and entitlements has not mitigated their sense of powerlessness before vast
structures of power that they can neither understand nor control. The reason is a para-
doxical loss of agency that results when liberty is detached from the formative project of
democratic self-government and located in the individual will.35 This is not to suggest,
as some do, that human agency would be increased by weaning the poor from their wel-
fare entitlements. The point here is that although such rights and entitlements may well
be a precondition of freedom, they are far from the whole of it.
The conservative thrust of U.S. politics toward devolution and privatization, which
has been gaining momentum since the 1970s, has provided another stimulus for the
return of religion to the public sphere insofar as it has revitalized the tradition that Lester
Salamon refers to as “third-party government.”36 Third-party government relies on volun-
tary associations and nonprofits to provide social services as an alternative to direct
government action. Channeling millions of public dollars to faith-based and other
nonprofits has stimulated enormous growth in the quantity and range of activities under-
taken by religious organizations. The implications of this development are numerous,
but outside of Stephen Monsma’s work, they have been little explored.37
Religion brings people together in mutual solidarity around matters that concern their
most exalted hopes and deeply held values; therefore the political potential in religious
movements is high.38 Regardless of whether the direction of these movements is radical
or conservative, they are usually of a populist political cast in the sense that they pres-
sure elites to respond to mass-based demands.39 U.S. history is replete with examples of
powerful, church-based popular crusades such as the antislavery movement, the temper-
ance movement, the populist movement, and the civil rights movement. Cox interprets
such seemingly disparate contemporary movements as Liberation Theology in Latin
America and Pentecostal movements in Africa, the United States, Latin America, and Asia
as signs of a worldwide populist revolt against liberal theology’s accommodation to
modernity and secularization.40 These and other spiritual movements signal the restora-
tion of faith as a political force in history making.
In the United States, conservative evangelicals are the most vocal and visible but by
no means the only example of religiously based efforts to generate moral vision and
moral discourse in the public arena. There is a new generation of believers, including
Jews, Muslims, Roman Catholics, and members of mainline Protestant denominations,
who envision a new public role for the church. A sizable number of them have formed
ecumenical partnerships to bring their ideas to fruition. Michael Lerner, editor of the
Jewish magazine Tikkun, charges that the political Left missed the boat by continuing to
focus on economic interests and individual rights in the face of a pervasive and deeply
felt hunger for meaning and spirituality.41 Lerner is launching a progressive movement
based on a spiritually rooted political vision that aims to overcome the selfishness and
cynicism which so thoroughly contaminate the public arena.42
Church and Metropolis
To speak of the church is to speak of a universe of religious entities, so it is important to
stress the high level of pluralism that characterizes religious life in the United States. The
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definition of the church, as used here, includes the entire body of U.S. faith communities,
dioceses, synods, councils of churches, and ecumenical coalitions. Major faith communi-
ties include Buddhist, Hindu, and Caribbean religions in addition to the Protestant,
Roman Catholic, Islamic, and Jewish faiths. Even single-faith communities are divided
into branches, factions, and schisms. Recognizing the diversity within and between faith
communities, Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll posit four ideal types or mission orienta-
tions  — activist, civic, sanctuary, and evangelistic — each of which represents a differ-
ent stance with regard to the polis.43
1. The activist orientation perceives the here and now of the world as the main arena of
God’s redemptive activity, and humankind as the primary agent of establishing God’s
kingdom on earth. For the activist church or synagogue, achievement of a more just and
humane society is a high priority, and the posture toward the existing social and eco-
nomic order tends to be rather critical.44
The activist orientation is based on a theological tradition that is common to a num-
ber of the world’s major faiths. This prophetic tradition embraces the concept of a God
who is deeply involved in human affairs and the unfolding of history. Churches,
mosques, and synagogues that embrace the prophetic tradition look at the world from the
vantage point of those who bear the social cost of prevailing arrangements and give
voice to the suffering. The Reverend Doe West, writing for Spare Change: New
England’s Journal of the Streets, adds that the prophetic vision includes the founda-
tional belief, based on shared faith principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition, that “so-
cial justice requires those with the greatest need as having the first claim on the resources
of the community.”45
Not every religious faith is guided by a prophetic tradition, and not every Christian,
Islamic, or Jewish congregation taps into that particular cultural heritage of the church.
Some congregations conform more closely to the larger culture in which they are embed-
ded, thus devoting the major part of their resources to building up membership, increas-
ing revenue, acquiring and maintaining buildings, and otherwise securing an advanta-
geous position in the religious marketplace. Others are doctrinally opposed to becoming
actively engaged with the secular world.
2. The civic orientation shares the activist orientation’s focus on this world and its sense
of responsibility for public life. But civic congregations are more comfortable with, even
affirming of, dominant social, political, and economic structures: less willing to accept,
even opposed to, the use of confrontational techniques in the service of change; and
more likely to define their public role in educational and cultural terms than in political
terms.46
Political disclaimers notwithstanding, many civic congregations have not hesitated to
employ the moral authority of the church to legitimate secular power relations and pre-
vailing social and economic arrangements. Many white churches assumed this stance
during the great civil rights struggles, as Martin Luther King, Jr., charged in his “Letter
from a Birmingham Jail.”47
 3. Whereas the activist and civic orientations are decidedly this-worldly in emphasis,
the sanctuary orientation is primarily focused on a world to come in which the cares of
this world will be surmounted. The church or synagogue exists mainly to provide
people with opportunities to withdraw, in varying degrees, from the trials and vicissi-
tudes of daily life into the company of committed fellow believers.48
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The sanctuary orientation shuns involvement with the secular world. Matters of poli-
tics and economics are not viewed as properly within the church’s purview. In the past,
liberal theology fostered this perspective among various mainline denominations.49 It
was also the norm among evangelical Protestants until they became politically mobi-
lized in reaction against the political gains made by feminists and gay rights activists in
the 1960s.50
4. The evangelistic orientation has much in common with the sanctuary orientation. Its
focus is on a future world in which temporal concerns are overcome. There is also
concern over the deterioration of traditional standards of personal morality. The major
difference is the evangelistic orientation’s clear sense of a publicly proactive role. Mem-
bers are encouraged to participate in public life, not for the purpose of social reform or
change, but to share the message of salvation with those outside the fellowship.51
Political mobilization has been growing among conservative evangelicals for the past
thirty years. On matters concerning the culture and individual morality, they are active at
all levels of government, including local school districts. They appeal to a widely felt
need to introduce an ethical and spiritual dimension in the public arena. “The religious
left lost its soul and we stepped into the vacuum,” said Ralph Reed, former director of the
Christian Coalition and chief spokesperson for Pat Robertson’s pro-family movement.52
But the New Christian Right gives scant attention to fundamental matters of social injus-
tice such as official indifference to the AIDS epidemic, increasing inequalities, break-
down of the social contract between employers and employees, and the abandonment of
the children of poor women and immigrants.53
Although the majority of white evangelicals have aligned themselves with the Re-
publican party, it is important to note that not all evangelicals are political conserva-
tives.54 Black evangelical churches blend theological conservatism with a prophetic,
liberationist message,55 as illustrated by their central role in the civil rights movement.56
Their loyalty to the Democratic party remains solid. While James Dobson, Jerry Falwell,
and Pat Robertson stake out positions in such policy areas as abortion, gay rights, and
welfare reform and support the election of conservative candidates at all levels of gov-
ernment, other evangelical groups, for instance, Sojourners and Evangelicals for Social
Action, have joined together to proclaim publicly that the religious right does not speak
for them. Their political concerns focus more on structural and institutional injustice and
what they view as a biblical mandate to serve as advocates and mediators for outsiders,
the weak, the disenfranchised, the despised, and the poor. This places them squarely
within the prophetic tradition and the activist orientation.
One controversial theory that has been offered for the sometimes intense disagree-
ments between conservative Christian groups and progressive forces in local communi-
ties is the culture wars argument, according to which U.S. society is in the grips of an
epic political power struggle between orthodox Christian values versus progressive,
ecumenical religious, and secular orientations.57 Kenneth Wald cautions that political
orientations do not divide as neatly along religious lines as this theory suggests.58 Nancy
Ammerman reports that her empirical research and that of others have failed to uncover
such a cultural divide.59 Robert Fowler and Allen Hertzke, restating the culture wars
argument, view the fundamental issue being contested as “What kind of society should
the United States be?”60 This is the question, so central to classical democratic theory,
that some religious leaders view the modern procedural republic as being unable to
address effectively.
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Eugene Rivers, pastor of the Azuza Christian Community in Boston, articulates a
belief, widely held in faith communities that range from the politically conservative to
the politically radical, that “only the church has the moral authority and the vocabulary
to introduce transcendent concepts of personal worth and the sacredness of life that will
both inspire responsibility on a personal level and introduce purpose and definition to
the role of civil government on a societal level.”61 Rivers considers the church a mediat-
ing structure with two functions in the public arena. First, it has an effect as a norm-
generating institution, either by its absence or its presence: it cannot be neutral. Follow-
ing William J. Wilson, Rivers argues that in the early 1970s, when middle-class black
churches abandoned the cities, they opened the floodgates to gangs, drug addiction,
family breakdown, violence, and despair.62 Second, he argues that because the church’s
Resurrectionary vision of civil society requires a moral vocabulary that is backed by
institutional infrastructures that will reproduce, maintain, and promote these religiously
based norms, the churches may be in a position to generate the social, moral, and cultural
capital without which the state is often powerless to implement its own social policies
effectively.63
Alexis de Tocqueville provided intellectual support for these ecumenical visions,
noting that in America, religions established a common base of morality, which pre-
vented majoritarian rule from descending into tyranny and served as an independent
voice of authority interposed between the individual and the state. More recently, this
argument has been deepened by intellectuals and scholars for whom the preservation of
freedom depends on the strongly felt presence of an autonomous church that will not
allow itself to be used or co-opted for political purposes.64
A Guiding Paradigm
“What image, model, or paradigm of the city, inner city, or metropolitan area has in-
formed the churches’ policy and strategy in cities?” In 1989, when theologian Clifford
Green posed this question to an ecumenical group of urban religious leaders who had
gathered for a conference at Union Theological Seminary, a comprehensive, guiding
paradigm of the city was articulated in response.65 In contrast to the culture of privatism,
which views the city as a producer of private capital and little besides,66 and in contrast
with televangelism’s “health and wealth gospel” and the “name it and claim it” theology
preached in suburban megachurches,67 this paradigm reflects a prophetic vision of the
divine commonwealth that explicitly and comprehensively challenges the individualism
and materialism of the commercial culture of cities. In contrast with the self-regarding
individualism of the market culture, it proclaims that the church’s mission of charity is
about human connection. It is a vision  “rooted in a shared biblical understanding that
human life before God is not the life of isolated, utilitarian individualists but life in
community.”68
Overcoming the divisions between inner city and suburbs, white and nonwhite, rich,
middle class, and poor presupposes a metropolitan paradigm. In the hope of transcending
the postwar urban-suburban bifurcation that has made the word urban into a code word
for inner-city blacks or Hispanics, all races and social classes are viewed as interdepen-
dent members of a holistic system that includes the people, institutions, and activities of
the whole city.69 This religious perspective is critical of the secular culture’s issue-related
approach to urban life, in which particular problems are typically related to particular
groups or neighborhoods and may not be viewed as problems of the city as such. It views
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single-issue agendas as harmful because they obscure the interrelatedness of such things
as violence, urban economics, unemployment, and drug addiction and because they lend
themselves to quick fixes when what is needed is a faithful presence and long-term com-
mitments.70
Congruent with this view of the metropolis as a single structural entity, the church,
not uncommonly, improvises metropolitan and ecumenical forms, directly opposing the
centrifugal forces associated with economic restructuring.71 The reorganization of the
black community along economic lines has physically isolated the extremely poor in the
inner cities, leaving them increasingly alienated, even from black institutions.72 Baptist
minister and sociologist Cheryl Gilkes views reaching the extremely deprived members
of the black community as the major challenge facing a predominantly middle- and
working-class black church.73 But growing inequalities, middle-class flight, and social
and cultural fragmentation are not problems of the black community only; they increas-
ingly characterize metropolitan areas generally. Again and again, this has driven congre-
gations into ecumenical coalitions and paracongregational groupings in their efforts to
bridge the inner cities and suburbs and span the divisions between neighborhoods, races,
and social classes so that the assets and resources of the church might be made accessible
to those most in need.74 Indeed, many denominations and other religious organizations,
for example, Habitat for Humanity and Prison Fellowship, operate on a global scale, as
do all the major faiths.
No Opiate for the Masses
Far from an opiate or an instrument of domination that reconciles the oppressed masses
to their subordinated status, as some Marxist scholars have argued,75 religious faith
grounded in the prophetic tradition inspires belief in the possibilities for real social
change, promoting political mobilization.76 Furthermore, people who believe they are
subject to divine guidance make significant sacrifices for the sake of their religious
ideals.77 Faith-based community organizing and development provide contemporary
examples of religiously inspired political action in cities. While basic information about
faith-based and other nonprofits is “grossly lacking, making it difficult to perceive the
sector or gauge its scope or role,” it is nevertheless possible, by gleaning pieces of evi-
dence from scattered case studies and insights from interviews with community organiz-
ers, nonprofit intermediaries, and church leaders, to assemble a picture of these activities,
albeit a partial one.78
Community Organizing
The church’s involvement in community organizing grew out of Saul Alinsky’s move-
ment, which began in the 1930s in Chicago’s “Back of the Yards” neighborhoods.79
Alinsky believed that poor people could achieve political empowerment by forming
alliances among existing neighborhood institutions.80 He also believed that “the end
justifies the means.” His preferred strategy for forcing elites to share power was to expose
his targets in dramatically staged public confrontations and subject them to ridicule.81
These tactics were controversial among middle-class churchgoers, but Alinsky’s ap-
proach resonated with Reinhold Niebuhr’s insistence that power is an inescapable factor
in every social transaction and inherent in every movement seeking social justice,82 o
many churches adopted his method.83
To fund his activities, Alinsky created the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) in 1940,
and established a training center in 1969. His brilliant, audacious public maneuvers
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made him a legendary figure, and he is still revered as the father of community organiz-
ing.84 Alinsky died in 1972. Today, the IAF is staffed by a team of 110 highly trained
organizers who contract with community groups — almost exclusively congregations —
to help build their organizations. Frequently cited examples include Baltimoreans
United for Leadership Development (BUILD), Communities Organized for Public Ser-
vice in San Antonio, East Brooklyn Congregations in New York, and United Neighbor-
hood Organizations in Los Angeles. In 1990, it was estimated that the combined mem-
bership base of IAF affiliates exceeded one million people.85
In the 1960s, interreligious community organizing was stimulated first by the civil
rights movement and then by the war in Vietnam and the urban disorders of that decade.
In the mid-1970s, the context for community organizing started to change. The loss of
jobs from the cities and the flight of the middle class to the suburbs meant that unions,
ethnic associations, political clubs, and small business associations,  the other neighbor-
hood organizations on which Alinsky’s movement was built, have weakened signifi-
cantly over the last three decades.86 Although many churches migrated to the suburbs in
the wake of urban economic restructuring, others remained as “survival institutions” in
inner-city neighborhoods.87 They are now in the vanguard of community organization.88
As the churches’ involvement in community activism broadened and deepened, the
number of community-organizing networks multiplied. There are five networks of ecu-
menical, faith-based coalitions: Direct Action Research Training, in Florida and the
Midwest, has 12 affiliates; the Gamaliel Foundation in Chicago has 35 affiliates; the
Industrial Areas Foundation has 65 affiliates in the United States; the Organization and
Leadership Training Center, in New England, has 6 affiliates; and the Pacific Institute for
Community Organizing  in California has 29 affiliates. These five networks combined
include 147 congregation-based coalitions. When unaffiliated coalitions are included,
the total is about 175 and growing  rapidly.
The church has had a major influence on the philosophy and practice of community
organizing.89 Under Alinsky’s leadership, the Industrial Areas Foundation’s single goal
was to teach poor people how to gain political power for its own sake. But when congre-
gations questioned the ends and uses of power in the light of their religious values and
cultural traditions, organizer Ernie Cortes and the IAF’s director, Ed Chambers, listened
and learned. The IAF then incorporated into its method the new understanding that indi-
viduals who are only weakly responsive to secular appeals based on narrow self-interest
can frequently be motivated to sustain long-term commitments to act on particular issues
when those issues are related to a larger purpose that fuses with their religious values and
faith.90 This partly explains why faith-based nonprofits, whose members are motivated
less by transitory issues than by enduring values, can serve as viable, long-lasting plat-
forms for a broad public agenda.91
Hula, Jackson, and Orr capture this potential with their concept of “governing
nonprofits,” for which they take BUILD as the prototype.
They take on roles and responsibilities traditionally reserved for the government, and
they forge coalitions among and across groups, organizations, and sectors to address
societal problems. These organizations require broad community support, embrace
flexible policy agendas, and operate in the public domain. The success of governing
nonprofits also lies in their ability to foster positive linkages with the local leadership
without becoming completely identified with local authorities.92
Baltimore’s experience with community activism illustrates most of these trends. In
the aftermath of the urban riots in the late 1960s, a Lutheran alliance joined Roman
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Catholic and Presbyterian groups and the Greater Baltimore Association to promote the
formation of five neighborhood organizations in that city. “These organizations moved
from confrontational activities to development of twenty-three community sponsored
housing programs very different from urban renewal. They became forerunners of
BUILD,” which was established in 1977 with assistance from IAF organizers.93 Today,
forty-five to fifty predominantly black churches and one labor union constitute the core
of BUILD’s membership. Its prophetic mandate to be a voice for the poor is explicit in its
mission statement, which is based on the teachings of the prophet Isaiah. BUILD’s influ-
ence has increased over the past two decades. It advances an agenda for the transforma-
tion of the whole city with issues ranging from arson control and rat eradication to hous-
ing, health care, municipal finance, and widely watched work in school reform.94
In 1967, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizing (IFCO) was created
by Rabbi Marc Tannenbaum of New York, the Reverend Edgar Chandler of the Chicago
Church Federation, Monsignor John Egan, director of the archdiocesan Office of Urban
Affairs in Chicago, and Rabbi Irving Rosenbaum of the Chicago Union of American
Hebrew Congregations. The IFCO’s mission was to promote and encourage community
organizing by recruiting personnel and channeling funding.95 Intermediary organizations
of this kind have sprung up all over the country, some under the auspices of religious
organizations and some not. The largest intermediaries are the Ford Foundation’s Local
Initiatives Support Corporation, with field offices in thirty-seven cities, and the Enter-
prise Foundation, founded by James Rouse.
Interreligious community organizing continued to accelerate during the 1970s, but in
1981 the Reagan administration’s cuts in government funding for social programs in-
creased the pressure on existing church organizations. The Reagan administration also
brought diminishing financial and political support from government and foundations
for community organizing and development. A second stage of faith-based community
organizing has since emerged. Ecumenical coalitions of neighborhood churches are
attempting to reduce their reliance on outside organizations because, in the earlier pe-
riod, they found that they were frequently co-opted.96 There is a new stress on indepen-
dence from government, foundation, and corporate funding and a new policy in many
religious organizations to finance most of their activities through fund-raising cam-
paigns and dues.97 Just as important is the innovative approach to community develop-
ment that these coalitions are taking. It represents a significant break with the past.98
Community Development
Faith-based community development is comprehensive, asset based, and driven from the
bottom up by congregations that remain firmly in charge. Whereas earlier, more tradi-
tional partnerships were based on the idea of citizen participation in government initia-
tives, the second stage of community development reverses these roles so that govern-
ment supports citizen initiatives.99 One of the reasons for the poor performance of many
neighborhood revitalization efforts in the 1980s was the lack of coordination among the
services offered by different providers.
Second-stage community development is comprehensive in that congregations en-
gage in a range of coordinated activities. Typically, they begin with one project, usually
housing development. As they gain experience, they expand into other areas, such as
health services, crime prevention, education, job creation, economic development, and
access to credit. Support from outside organizations is needed and welcomed, but instead
of ceding control as they did in the past, these faith-based community development
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corporations (CDC) devise and implement their own novel approaches according to their
priorities, opportunities, and resources.100
Bethel New Life illustrates the comprehensive approach to community building.101 I
1965, two Lutheran pastors, a brother and sister, went to Chicago to minister to thirty-
five white families at Bethel Church, located in a part of the city where the population
had changed from 35,000 whites to 60,000 blacks in five years. Bethel New Life, the
CDC the congregation created, began with $9,500. By 1995 it had grown to a coalition
of thirteen churches with a budget of more than $10 million, employing nearly 500
people.102 Green summarizes this remarkable growth.
The “circle of things” at Bethel were a vibrant worshipping congregation that initiated
the neighborhood redemption; a volunteer and sweat equity housing program; control of
the rebuilding by local residents; increasing financial strength, enabling deals to be made
with city government and banks; the joining of over twenty neighborhood congrega-
tions in an Isaiah plan for new housing; converting a failing hospital to a community
center with programs for the elderly, day care for children, and art programs; coopera-
tive efforts in sewing, home care, and recycling; and a creative experiment using welfare
funds for a Self-Sufficiency Program.103
Contrary to the evidence presented here, modern liberalism posits an individual who
consumes only  public goods but does not produce them. Hence modern secular organi-
zations tend to treat individuals as consumers and clients. In low-income communities,
however, where material incentives may be lacking, individuals frequently make sub-
stantial commitments of their time and resources when provided with opportunities to
acquire the knowledge and self-confidence that enable them to become producers, in-
stead of merely consumers, of public goods.104 Since second-stage community develop-
ment is asset based and driven from the bottom up, residents are no longer cast in the role
of agency clients. They are treated as citizens with personal assets that are potentially
valuable to the commonwealth.105 The recognition that self-reliance and independence
are necessary for self-respect is the basis for Alinsky’s “iron rule of organizing” — “Never
do anything for people that they can do for themselves.”106
The Nehemiah Project of the East Brooklyn Congregations illustrates asset-based
housing development initiated by religious organizations.
By 1990, twenty-three-hundred units had been produced by the working poor, 40
percent of whom came from public housing. First organizing dollars were provided by
the LCMS [Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod]. A development loan came from the
Roman Catholic Bishop in Brooklyn. The city was shamed into a tardy grant of $10,000
per unit, repayable if a house were sold for profit.107
Comprehensive, asset-based, bottom-up approaches are widely emulated by organiza-
tions in the secular sphere. The Boston Persistent Poverty Project of the Boston Founda-
tion was explicitly designed to conform to these themes. It makes its support conditional
on communities developing their own asset-based strategies.108 Boston’s famous Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative is an example.109 The National Community Building
Network, a twenty-two-city network of community-driven intermediaries, which dissemi-
nates information about strategies for community building and serves as an advocate for
community development in national policy forums, was founded in 1993 on these prin-
ciples.
The church’s activities are shaping the way policymakers think about cities. From
1973, former Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary Henry Cisneros had
19
witnessed the evolution of Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) from a
single Roman Catholic parish in San Antonio to a network that was able to defeat a tax-
limitation initiative with statewide door-to-door campaigning in 1987. COPS also
passed landmark statewide legislation around issues of school district financing, health
care, and farm safety.110 Cisneros, who had extensive contact with COPS before and dur-
ing his San Antonio mayoralty, announced that HUD endorsed the comprehensive ap-
proach developed by COPS and other faith-based nonprofits and was revising its proce-
dures accordingly.111 Vice President Al Gore made it the basis of his Empowerment Zone/
Enterprise Community approach to community building.112
Third-Party Government
Liberal policies of the past with their modernist thrust, based on rights and universal
criteria, tended not to respect community, partly because of the liberal state’s equation of
community with group parochialism, authoritarianism, and intolerance. Instead of build-
ing civic commitments, liberal policies undermined them. The church’s involvement in
the kinds of activities discussed here offers the potential to build civic commitments
with public policies that nurture such church involvement. It is important, then, to con-
sider some of the reasons why church-based third-party government tends to evoke skep-
ticism among liberals.
First, some observers fear that increasing government reliance on the voluntary sector
could further reduce its social welfare role, which is already minimal by the standard of
other industrialized Western democracies. This concern stems from conservative and
libertarian claims that religious missions of charity and social service provision have the
capacity somehow to release the federal government from its responsibilities and com-
mitments in the social domain.113 The consequences of acting on this misguided notion
are suggested by Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll’s  report that in Hartford, Connecticut,
after the Reagan administration reduced federal funding for social programs, a flood of
referrals from financially strapped city agencies completely overwhelmed the staff and
resources of Central City Churches, an established coalition of eight congregations
whose creative realization of the ecumenical possibilities of urban ministry had made it a
model for interreligious urban missions and ministries nationwide.114 Far from being an
alternative to government, nonprofits typically depend on government for more than
half their funding for the provision of social services.115
Second, community development by churches has legal and political ramifications,
partly because of the symbiotic relationship that characterizes church and state in the
provision of many community services. Using public dollars to fund religiously based
nonprofit organizations has not, so far, significantly compromised religious freedoms,
according to Monsma.116 But he cautions that religious organizations which provide
social services are vulnerable to co-optation because of the arbitrary and ad hoc nature of
legal doctrine and government practice in this area and the large sums of money in-
volved.
Third, the particularism of many religious institutions and other nonprofits has raised
concerns about the possibility of discrimination in the provision of services.117 Profes-
sional organizers typically emphasize thepublic character of church-based activism, and
they thoroughly inculcate norms of openness, accountability, and acceptance of differ-
ence in the organizations with which they work for precisely that reason. An important
government contribution to these partnerships is in ensuring that priorities are set more
democratically than they might otherwise be and to guarantee universality of access to
their services.118
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Why Does the Church Lead?
It is important to reflect on what is unique about religious traditions and why congrega-
tions, instead of progressive, secular organizations, are taking the lead in community
organizing. The church must be seen as more than a set of organizations if its singular
role in the city is to be made comprehensible. The church is a worldview, a conservator
of sacred traditions, the sum of innumerable communities of like-minded believers, a
vast complex of powerful institutions with local-global connections, and an independent
base of transcendent moral authority. Following Wald, I submit that religion has three
faces — creed, institution, and subculture — each of which contributes to its potential to
influence political action.119 In addition, I want to posit two contextual factors that help
to explain the church’s success in mobilizing communities where secular efforts have
failed. The first is the problem of nihilism, which, in the judgment of some close observ-
ers, only the church has the resources to dispel effectively.120 The second relates to the
decline of other mediating institutions produced by global economic restructuring.
Consider these five factors in greater detail.
Creed
Wald’s first face of religion is what he calls creed, meaning bodies of religious beliefs,
values, teachings, and symbols that inhere to particular faiths and have the potential to
inspire political action.121 Community organizers report that narrow electoral politics
and appeals to self-interest are no longer sufficient to motivate the working class and the
poor to participate in local politics in large numbers. However, religion entails a values
imperative that calls people to act on their faith.122
Like the monks who preserved learning in Christian monasteries throughout the Dark
Ages, today’s church preserves an institutional awareness that human beings are not only
driven by egoistic self-interest and self-preservation, as modernism would have it; they
are also driven by profound moral and spiritual aspirations. This insight is confirmed by
the fact that when people are facilitated in their desire to contribute to a larger, more
dignified, and nobler purpose than the egoistic pursuit of material gain, they can fre-
quently be motivated to make significant sacrifices and commitments to the organiza-
tion or community that thus endows them with dignity, self-respect, respect of others,
and a strong sense of agency.123
Richard Wood’s research shows that symbolic systems of meaning which are embed-
ded in particular religious traditions undergird the capacity of some congregations and
church-based coalitions to sustain major initiatives in the public sphere and carry them
through to completion.124 But how are we to understand more concretely how creed
inspires sustained, collective, community activism? Religion teleologically structures
past, present, and future in morally purposeful ways. By drawing on ritual and other
symbolic resources, churches, mosques, and synagogues integrate the lives of their mem-
bers into the community of saints and fellowship with other believers. Prophetic, biblical
religion is rich in stories, symbols, and metaphors which convey God’s intention that his
people act as coworkers in establishing justice, relieving suffering, and healing the
world. Numerous lessons and parables inspire congregations to take principled political
action.
 The motivating potential of creed is rendered more intellectually accessible by the
work of narrative theorists.125 David Novitz explains that, through stories, we construct
our self-image, which determines how we treat others, what challenges we embrace or
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shrink from, what rights or considerations we expect, and how we and others like us are
treated by others, including the state; so narrative has a political dimension.126 C sider,
for example, the massive affordable housing program of the East Brooklyn Congrega-
tions. Its name, Nehemiah Homes, was selected after Johnny Ray Youngblood, an EBC
pastor, preached a sermon about Nehemiah, the Old Testament leader to whom the king
of Persia gave permission to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the ancient city that had lain
in ruins for one hundred years. By pointing out the many parallels to their own situation,
this pastor encouraged his largely black congregation to identify with Jews of the fifth
century B.C., who undertook the work of rebuilding their city in the face of enormous
political and practical obstacles. Youngblood motivated his and other congregations to
join in rebuilding large parts of East Brooklyn.127 For Boyte, this Old Testament imagery
is “far removed from the nonideological vocabulary of raw power and self-interest most
often associated with [secular] community organizations.”128 It is also far more persua-
sive.
Institution
The second face of religion is institutional.129 Indeed, the church is an institution of
almost unlimited scope and complexity. Among the institutional advantages it brings to
bear on community revitalization, public esteem is an important political resource, par-
ticularly when religious leaders negotiate with public officials or attempt to form coali-
tions across institutional boundaries. Another resource is the wealth of talented, highly
trained, professional leadership in the clergy.130 The church also has organizational ad-
vantages in its large formal memberships, regular meetings, professional staffs, publica-
tions, and ties to denominational and interdenominational movements and hierarchies
that are local, national, and global in reach. Wald reports that “several of the largest
churches have become the hubs for worldwide operations, complete with the organiza-
tional complexity of a major corporation.”131 Although the church, at every level of orga-
nization, is fraught with internal conflicts and divisions, the fact remains that few if any
secular organizations can even begin to match its institutional potential.132
Subculture
The third face of religion is its character as subculture. Wald explains:
By virtue of participating in a social network, the church member may encounter mes-
sages about political issues and interact with fellow members who adhere to the
church’s line. A person surrounded by church members who participate actively in a
campaign is likely to learn about the issues from a religious point of view, to receive
encouragement about joining in the activity, and to observe and acquire social skills that
may promote political success. Though not intended for that purpose, congregational
organizations may serve as leadership-training institutes for people who lack other
means of exposure to organizational skills.133
In 1973, when Ernie Cortes went to San Antonio to organize the Mexican-American
community on the city’s west side, his place of origin, this Industrial Areas Foundation
coordinator demonstrated a keen awareness of the political significance of the church as
a subculture. Roman Catholicism was by far the strongest, most vital belief system for
that community. Cortes could not imagine successful civic activity that would not draw
on the rituals and traditions of the church and its institutional strength.134 On the basis of
that strength and tradition, Cortes went on to build Communities Organized for Public
Service (COPS) into the largest civic organization in the country by 1987. By 1990,
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COPS and its affiliated church-based organizations in Texas were estimated to represent
at least 400,000 people. No longer limiting itself to neighborhood and local government
issues, this network became a major political force in the state.135
Nihilism
Philosopher Cornell West further elucidates the central role of the church in urban revi-
talization when he defines the fundamental problem as nihilism, by which he means “the
profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair
so widespread in black America.”136 West argues that liberal social-scientific discomfort
with moral and cultural concepts and inhibitions about acknowledging underclass social
pathologies has led scholars to overlook this most fundamental of threats: “To talk about
the distressing statistics of unemployment, infant mortality, incarceration, teenage preg-
nancy, and violent crime is one thing. But to face up to the monumental eclipse of hope,
the unprecedented collapse of meaning, the incredible disregard for human (especially
Black)  life and property in much of Black America is something else.”137 West contends
that by emphasizing human agency, the prophetic church instills hope and keeps alive
the notion that “history is incomplete, and the world is unfinished, and the future is
open-ended and that what we think and what we do can make a difference.”138
West indicts U.S. society for failing to nurture children morally and spiritually, failing
to equip them with the inner resources they need to make it through life’s unavoidable
difficulties and disappointments without succumbing to nihilism. He laments “the
deracinated state of their souls” that leaves them “easy prey to the culture of consump-
tion.” He views the prophetic church, not market religion, as the single most important
institution for addressing that spiritual emptiness.139 “I do believe that prophetic
churches, prophetic mosques, prophetic synagogues, can all play a fundamental role in
nurturing children by transmitting non-market values . . . love, care, service to others,
sacrifice, risk, community, struggles for justice, solidarity, all of these are non-market
values against a market culture.”140 Contrary to popular perceptions, nihilism does not
affect black Americans only.141 Surveys indicate that young people of all races and social
classes have become objects of mounting concern because of their cynicism, hedonism,
and lack of ethics and morals.142 The Center for Juvenile Justice documents their growing
propensity for violent crime.143
To define the urban crisis in cultural terms, as West has done, is not to deny structural
causes because structure and culture are closely linked, reciprocal processes that create
and reinforce each another.144 Therefore, to identify nihilism as a fundamental problem in
distressed urban communities is not to negate the need for structural change. It is rather
to say that if the urban crisis were addressed in structural terms only, such efforts would
be likely to fail.145 Every secular program, whether conservative or progressive, which
attempts solutions based on economistic assumptions that human beings are motivated
solely by self-interest and self-preservation, is likely to fail because “degraded and op-
pressed people are also hungry for identity, meaning, and self-worth.”146
Who is addressing the meaninglessness, hopelessness, and most of all, lovelessness
that West views as the core problem for black America and may well be the core problem
for the rest of America? “Where do ordinary people, steeped in lifelong experiences of
humiliation, barred from acquisition of basic skills of citizenship — from running meet-
ings to speaking in public — gain the courage, the self-confidence, and above all the
hope to take action in their own behalf?” ask scholars and community activists Sarah
Evans and Harry Boyte. “What are the structures of support, the resources, and the expe-
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riences that generate the capacity and the inspiration to challenge ‘the way things are’
and imagine a different world?”147 For these authors, the answer is that individuals find
this kind of experience in what they have called fr e space, which occurs in various
forms of open, autonomous, voluntary association with a strong public dimension that is
independent from dominant power.148 For Americans, particularly black and Hispanic
Americans, that free space is most often found in the church.
If the church conveys a positive identity and gives meaning to suffering and hope of
ultimate victory over adversity, it also gives meaning and direction to anger. “Anger that
is focused and deep and rooted in grief is a key element in the organizing of black
churches in the 1980s.”149 Organizers who have worked with the black church have
learned how to channel this anger into a healing, constructive, redemptive kind of en-
gine for change because untransformed anger turns into either rage or depression and
apathy. In either case, it fuels the nihilism of which West has written.150
The Nation of Islam, aproto-Islamic movement often in tension with the teachings of
traditional Islam, provides an instructive and sobering illustration of the power of reli-
gion to motivate individuals and communities with appeals to their history and heri-
tage.151 Does any secular organization compare with the record of this black nationalist
movement in redeeming the lives of black men who are most at risk and establishing
black-owned enterprises? Students of religious history attribute most of the Nation of
Islam’s appeal to Elijah Muhammad’s inspirational leadership between 1934 and 1975
and Malcolm X’s calls for black pride, black power, and black consciousness during the
1960s and early 1970s. Both men became culture heros.152 It is difficult to evaluate
whether the movement’s current success in recruiting black men is because of or in spite
of its present leader, Louis Farrakhan. HisMillion Man March was a spiritual experience
of historic dimensions for many who participated in it, but his reputation for pandering
to racism, sexism, and black anti-Semitism has sharply diminished his moral and spiri-
tual stature. Traditional Islam attracts large numbers of black men without appealing to
black xenophobia.153
Endurance
The church is the most stable institution in low-income neighborhoods. Most of the
neighborhood organizations that existed twenty-five years ago have either moved to the
suburbs in the wake of capital disinvestment and middle-class flight or withered away.154
Economic restructuring and the fragmentation of social class consciousness have meant
that few large Left organizations with political power and monetary resources are still in
the cities. In urban areas such as South Central Los Angeles, churches and liquor stores
are virtually the only neighborhood institutions that remain.155 With the Left in ideologi-
cal disarray following the collapse of East European communism,156 and with political
parties and labor unions severely weakened by global restructuring and other factors,157 a
new politics of identity, which inhibits the development of broad secular coalitions with
progressive agendas, has emerged.158 As the twentieth-first century commences, the
church is virtually the only neighborhood institution remaining in cities that is stable
enough and commands sufficient resources to serve as a building block for large-scale
organizing.159
Back to the Formative Project
I have argued that a convergence of forces has so weakened traditional mediating institu-
tions that the church, which is virtually the only stable neighborhood institution remain-
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ing in cities, takes the lead in community activism. Faith communities bring exceptional
resources to the task of community organizing, including strong institutions, outside
denominational support, and unusual leadership skills in the clergy.160 Their political
potential is enhanced by creeds and narratives that bind and motivate communities of
fellow believers.
Trust in representative forms of democracy has declined so precipitously that indi-
viduals no longer respond in large numbers to narrow appeals based on electoral politics.
Voter turnout at all levels of government is exceedingly low. However, individuals still
respond to the moral authority of the church. There is evidence of a worldwide resur-
gence of religion, especially among women, minorities, and the poor, for whom an exist-
ence based on the Darwinian principle “every man for himself” offers slight security and
cold comfort. In a world in which moral claims and social attachments are no longer
universally acknowledged or treated as binding, the prophetic church asserts human
connection. It holds individuals responsible to and for one another and holds the nations
accountable for their treatment of society’s most vulnerable members — outsiders, the
sick, the elderly, the young, the despised, and the poor. The prophetic church has a solu-
tion to the problem of nihilism, grounding its members in a supportive, moral commu-
nity regardless of how far away they have fallen and providing them with personal
mentoring and citizenship and leadership training.161 For all these reasons, community
activism in the United States is now led by the church.
A survey of the development of Western thought shows that forces of modernity
gradually divested public discourse and scholarship of their earlier religious and moral
dimensions, leaving policy science ill equipped to deal with intangible values and cul-
tural forces of the type discussed here. By about 1960, scientific positivism had rel-
egated questions concerning morality and faith to a status far from the mainstream. Al-
though the positivist orthodoxy is being challenged, and there is evidence of a world-
wide resurgence of religion as a political force in the world, students of urban politics
have continued to focus on political and economic institutions from a top-down perspec-
tive while underestimating the importance of community, culture, and neighborhood
organizations, especially the church. There is evidence in  recent literature, however, that
this is starting to change.
It is significant that community organizing has evolved from a confrontational leftist
radicalism to become deeply identified with the church. The church w it large moves
beyond traditional religious divisions to form coalitions across faiths, denominations,
subdivisions, and sects. Following Marston and Towers, I would like to suggest that what
we are witnessing may be part of a much larger trend. These scholars conclude that
“Americans across the country are disillusioned and frustrated with their representatives
and are increasingly discounting the ballot box as an effective mechanism for voicing
their views. These same Americans are becoming politically active at the local level,
where they feel their efforts can most tangibly be realized.”162 Marston and Towers view
this development as a “quiet revolution” of sorts — a return to more direct, participatory
forms of local democracy.163 To these broad observations I would add one further claim:
Just as urban restructuring has emptied the inner cities of almost all viable neighborhood
institutions save the church, forces of modernity have so emptied the public sphere of its
normative and transcendent dimensions that the church alone is left with enough moral
standing to rise to the demand for a return to the formative project.z
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